Could the fuel crisis in Russia break the back of the Russian war economy? It has already evolved from a problem into a systemic vulnerability. Strikes on oil refineries have put at risk the domestic infrastructure essential to the day-to-day functioning of the Russian state.

A symbolic and practical turning point was the strike on the Omsk refinery - Russia's largest refinery and one of its key producers of gasoline and diesel. After the attack, the refinery halted processing. The Moscow refinery in Kapotnya, the largest fuel supplier to the capital region, is unlikely to resume operations before at least the end of the year following strikes in June.

Estimates of the scale of the damage vary, but they point to the same trend: Ukraine is no longer merely carrying out isolated strikes on individual targets but is creating a cumulative effect in which Russia's repair capacity is beginning to fall behind the pace of damage.

The most vulnerable point in this crisis is the agricultural sector. The harvest has coincided with peak summer fuel demand, making diesel a critical resource. Russia's harvesting campaign in early July was running one to two weeks behind last year's pace, with weather and fuel supply problems cited among the reasons. Crops are being harvested late, grain quality is deteriorating, and logistics costs are rising.

As expected, large agricultural holdings - which have stockpiles, long-term contracts, access to the wholesale market, and administrative channels - are faring better. Small and medium-sized farmers, by contrast, are likely to go bankrupt.

The Russian authorities continue largely to deny the problem, but in practice they are shifting toward emergency management of the shortage. The first set of measures involves a ban on diesel exports and the start of fuel imports. For a country accustomed to presenting itself as an energy superpower, the very need to import petroleum products is humiliating.

The second set of measures is the degradation of standards. The Russian government has allowed the use of Euro-3 gasoline until the end of 2026, and parliament has passed tax changes that permit the use of lower-quality components for blending straight-run gasoline, postpone part of the refinery modernization, and provide for subsidies for fuel imports.

The third set of measures is administrative rationing. In June, most Russian regions introduced some form of restriction on gasoline or diesel sales: volume limits, unreliable fuel availability, pumps marked "out of service," lines, and periodic disruptions at gas stations.

In the medium term, the worst effects may emerge not only in the 2026 harvest but also in the next agricultural cycle - primarily during the 2027 sowing season. The fuel crisis has only just begun, but the most interesting period still lies ahead: seasonal demand peaks in August and September.

The future of Russia's war economy will depend primarily on the balance between the pace of Ukrainian strikes, the effectiveness of Russian air defenses, and the ability of repair crews to restore refinery operations. If that balance continues to shift against Russia, the fuel crisis could create conditions in which the Russian authorities would want to end the war.

📹: Fiery footage of attacks on the Moscow oil refinery and other targets in Russia