One Question That Destroys Europe’s “China Is Winning” Narrative.
Europe Says China Is Winning. Then Renews NATO Commitments

Over the past year, a common claim has circulated in European media and think-tank circles: that Donald Trump’s “America First” policies failed to strengthen the United States and instead helped China “become great again.”

This argument leans heavily on a public-opinion survey published by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). The headline takeaway is familiar: more people now view China as a “necessary partner,” while fewer see the U.S. as a reliable friend. From this, some commentators conclude that America is declining and China is rising, and that Trump accelerated the shift.

But this conclusion confuses perception with power.

Public opinion is not strategy. Sentiment is not alignment. Calling China a “necessary partner” is not the same as trusting China with your security, values, or long-term future.

If China were truly seen as the better alternative to the United States, we would see it where it actually matters: alliances, military coordination, intelligence sharing, and binding commitments.

Yet reality tells a very different story.

Every European country remains in NATO.
Not a single one has exited to align with Beijing.
Defense cooperation with the U.S. continues to deepen.

European militaries still train, plan, and operate with American forces, not Chinese ones.
That alone should settle the debate.

There is also a methodological problem rarely acknowledged. The ECFR survey includes polling conducted in China, an authoritarian state with strict speech controls. Independent public opinion does not exist there. Any polling must be conducted through official channels and can only reflect the government’s preferred narrative. Treating this data as equivalent to polling in open societies is analytically unserious.

More broadly, the idea that Trump “made China stronger” assumes that global power flows toward whoever appears more diplomatic. That is not how geopolitics works.

Power is built through industrial capacity, energy security, military readiness, technological depth, and demographic resilience. On many of these fronts, China faces mounting structural constraints, while the U.S., despite its dysfunction, retains decisive advantages.

What these European surveys are really capturing is discomfort, not realignment. Discomfort with Trump’s style. Discomfort with pressure to increase defense spending. Discomfort with being forced to choose instead of hedging.

Labeling China a “necessary partner” often serves as a rhetorical signal of frustration with Washington, not a declaration of confidence in Beijing.

And here is the key point: when Europe faces genuine security threats, it does not turn to China. It turns to the United States. Every time.

In geopolitics, words are cheap. Alliances are not.

And on that scoreboard, nothing fundamental has changed.