I very much share your question. My own observation is that He Weidong and Zhang Youxia were purged for different, concrete reasons, and in both cases those reasons—much as you have consistently argued in your insightful Foreign Affairs essays—were ultimately interpreted by Xi Jinping through the lens of suspicion about challenges to his authority.

That said, my view is that the dozens of senior generals and admirals purged prior to Zhang Youxia’s removal are unlikely to have had a significant impact on preparations for the 2027 goal.

Among the many objectives tied to the 2027 timeline, the key issue I have observed is training reform. Organizational restructuring and new equipment programs are largely complete, or at least have met baseline requirements. What remains unresolved is the establishment of a new model for joint training. For Xi Jinping, this is a political objective. Zhang Youxia was expected to endorse that joint training reform had been completed and that the 2027 goal had effectively been achieved—or, as William Burns and the U.S. Department of Defense’s 2025 China Military Power Report put it, that the PLA would be (nominally) ready/capable to invade Taiwan.

From the PLA’s perspective, this is a matter of annual training plan design and execution. That responsibility falls primarily on Zhang Youxia, Liu Zhenli, and the Training Management Department, which plan and oversee implementation across the force. It is true that other senior officers and theater commanders play important roles in joint operations, but the concrete execution of training and the exploration of new training models can proceed even without their direct involvement. At the same time, discipline inspection units appear to be conducting on-site monitoring during training, and political officers within training units have also been instructed to be capable of leading training activities when commanding officers are not present.

At the same time, my reading is that the reasons behind the purges of He Weidong and others differ from those behind the cases of Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, at least based on publicly available information.

In the cases of He Weidong, Miao Hua, and related figures, my analysis of PLA Daily language—together with the priorities outlined for political work and discipline inspection in 2025—suggests that the purges were driven primarily by problems in personnel management and potential factional issues linked to a “Fujian clique.” These cases align closely with your analysis of Xi’s suspicion and efforts at power consolidation. However, I would argue that they are not directly connected to advancing the 2027 goal, and their impact on progress toward that objective is likely to be limited.

Below are some of my previous pieces on this topic:

Cronyism and Failed Promotions: Xi’s PLA Purge
https://t.co/6Iy5XbUMnX

CMC Reshapes PLA Political Work System
https://t.co/g5c1dEdovY

Latest PLA Anti-Corruption Campaign Enhances Xi Jinping’s Control Over the Military
https://t.co/FLz3RlZ4ny

He Weidong’s Possible Downfall and Xi’s Trust Deficit With the PLA
https://t.co/pUTI0IjO2B