A simulation study by Chinese scientists shows how 🇨🇳 PLA could attempt to block Starlink across Taiwan.

Their findings — published on Nov 5 in the Chinese peer-reviewed journal Systems Engineering and Electronics — suggest that jamming Starlink across a region as large as Taiwan is technically feasible, but only at an immense scale that would require 1,000 to 2,000 electronic warfare drones.

The paper, titled “Simulation research of distributed jammers against mega-constellation downlink communication transmissions”, was written by a team from Zhejiang University and Beijing Institute of Technology (BIT) — the latter a top player in China’s defense research.

“The orbital planes of Starlink are not fixed, and the movement trajectories of the constellation are highly complex, with the number of satellites entering the visible area constantly changing.”

“This spatiotemporal uncertainty poses a significant challenge for any third party attempting to monitor or counter the Starlink constellation.”

Traditional satellite communication relies on a handful of large, geostationary satellites fixed above the equator. To block them, the Chinese military just needs to overpower their signal from the ground.

But Starlink is different. Its satellites are low, fast and numerous. A single user terminal does not connect to one satellite — it rapidly hops between multiple ones, creating a mesh network in the sky. Even if you manage to block one signal, the connection jumps to another within seconds.

Moreover, Starlink uses advanced phased-array antennas and frequency-hopping techniques that adapt in real time, much of which is controlled remotely by SpaceX engineers in the US.

Starlink could be countered by a distributed jamming strategy. Hundreds or thousands of small, synchronized jammers would need to be deployed across the sky — on drones, balloons or aircraft — forming an electromagnetic shield over the battlefield.

Using actual Starlink satellite data, the team simulated the dynamic positioning of satellites over a 12-hour period above eastern China. They modelled the downlink signal strength from Starlink satellites, reception pattern of user terminals, propagation of interference from ground to sky and sky to ground, and the cumulative effect of multiple jammers hitting the same terminal from different angles.

Then they introduced a grid of virtual jammers, flying at 20km altitude, spaced between 5 and 9km apart like a chessboard in the sky.

Each jammer emitted noise at various power levels, mimicking realistic electronic warfare payloads.

Two types of antennas were tested — one with a wide beam which covered more area but spread energy thinly, and a narrow-beam one that was focused and powerful, but required precision.
The simulation calculated, for every point on the ground, whether a Starlink terminal could maintain a usable signal.

Under optimal conditions — using a powerful but costly 26 decibel-watt (dBW) jamming power (400 watt) source, a narrow-beam antenna and 7km spacing — each jammer node suppressed Starlink reception across an average area of 38.5 sq km.

Taiwan covers around 36,000 sq km.

To blanket the island with reliable Starlink suppression would require at least 935 coordinated interference nodes, and this number does not include redundancy for failures, compensating for terrain such as mountains that block signals and countering Starlink’s future anti-jamming upgrades.

Using a weaker but more affordable 23 dBW power source with 5km spacing would double the drone deployment scale to around 2,000 units.

The results were preliminary because Starlink kept some key technology confidential.

“If it becomes possible in the future to obtain actual measurements of the radiation pattern data of Starlink user terminals, and to acquire empirically measured values of the suppression coefficients for these terminals, it would help achieve more accurate assessment results.”

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