was actually excited to see someone finally talking about how gangs factor into a PRC-Taiwan takeover scenario

but this is disappointing effort https://t.co/4A2ApSj1Wh

my own analysis:

gangs are central to the most material, highest-impact forms of PRC penetration in Taiwan today, including espionage, elite targeting, and transnational repression.

in the event of a takeover, the issue is not military style assaults, but sub-threshold disruption - meaning, the space between peace and collapse. before the PLA lands or without them landing, gangs can already create the illusion of state collapse.

at present taiwanese gangs already act as bodies for hire in politics. they act as bums-for-hire at rallies, intimidate opponents, mobilize temple networks, move money, and act as muscle for United Front events. none of this requires loyalty of ideology. people are incentivized by money which is why they get into gangs in the first place - in taiwan it's a legitimate career option for youths from unstable or low-income households. gangs claim to be their families.

if gangs and members (personally i think most already do) see the PRC coming in as essentially a different political party taking over, you can bet these forces will move quickly to position themselves.

gangs are perfect vectors for disinformation, intimidation, road blockades, and coercion at protest sites. i'm sorry but aggrieved students don't stand much of a chance at all.

as seen in hong kong, gang involvement can be deniable, localized, cheap, and high-impact.

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now, counterarguments to the @globaltaiwan article

1) local 角頭 won't risk their local standing if PRC fails --

what if they anticipate CCP to win? in that case not cooperating is risky

2) lower level members are minors underprepared for military-style assaults.

roles played by triads in HK 2019 was not mentioned in this piece at all and really should have been. it doesn't take military-style assaults for gangs to make a significant difference in a takeover situation

also reality check re modern domestic gang shootouts/intimidation in Taiwan: gunmen are 17–23 in almost every well-documented instance. no such thing as minors being underprepared. if anyone is going to fire shots it's minors, because their bosses would order them to. if they say they're not prepared they get beaten

3) Minor gang members won't attack friends, family, and communities for a foreign power

Taiwanese criminal networks already traffic Taiwanese civilians abroad, including people from their own towns, schools, and neighborhoods - and yes, these crimes do involve minors and young adults

4) Lack of pro-Beijing ideology

as mentioned it's not (only) ideology that motivates collaboration with CCP. money is a pretty good reason. a lot of people also do think Beijing will win /has won due to sheer might. It's possible for people to hold two ideas at the same time -- to simultaneously prefer Taiwan sovereignty and fear/anticipate Beijing takeover

5) Middle managers are known to police

This doesn't stop them from dealing drugs (long sentences) trafficking people and laundering money now. Why stop at sabotage or espionage?

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biggest flaw of the article is methodology. author interviewed ONE person (and one that left gang to pursue education which is decisively unrepresentative) - and goes on to make sweeping claims about gang psychology, loyalty structures, and decision-making

why do i seem to know too much about gangs? i spent 2+ years in Taiwan training full-time as an MMA athlete and spent a lot of time with gang members who trained/ate/drank alongside me. i guess that does make me one of the more informed in china/taiwan studies about gangs